## DOS REVIEWED 27-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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PRIDRITY /PUUTINE FSA935BIA795 DE RUESBI #1447 2951405 P R 2214002 DCI 73 FM AMEMBASSY ARU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIDRITY 1051

INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1274
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0318
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0277
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0553
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0265
USUN PRIORITY 0044

CONFIDENTIAL ABU DHABI 1447

11652: GDS PFOR TO US REALTION TO US-SUVIET CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION ADDPTION BY SC OF US-USSR CEASE-FIRE RESO-EUTTON AND PROSPECTS FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD PER-MANENT SETTLEMENT SEEM TO HAVE HAD IMMEDIATE DESTRED rimpectiof: Lowering Dangerously High Political Tempera-TORE IN ABU DHABI. UNDER SEC GHUBASH HOPEFUL SUPER POWERS NOW PREPARED TO PUT FULL WEIGHT BEHIND AGREED INTERPRETATION OF RES 242 AS BASIS FOR FAIR SETTLEMENT. DEFUSING OF CRISIS MAY HAVE CUME JUST IN TIME TO HAVE AVERTED STRUNGER RETALIATURY MEESURES AGAINST US, WITH RUPTURE D DIPL RELATIONS HAVING BEEN DISCUSSED. GHUBASH BELIEVES USG: HAS FOLLOWED CORRECT POLICY IN NOT DVER REACTING TO ABU DHABI OIL EMBARGO DECISION. CHARGE STRESSED USG FULLY UNDERSTANDING DIFFICULT TRAUMA ARAB MURLO PASSING THROUGH, AND FOR OUR PART WE INTEND DO UTMOST PRESERVE GOOD RELATIONS DEVELOPED TO DATE WITH UAE.

ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL HAS ADOPTED JOINT US-USSR CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION SEEMS TO HAVE HAD IMMEDIATE DESIRED EFFECT HERE OF LOWERING POLITICAL TEMPERATURES, WHICH WE FEEL HAD REACHED DANGEROUSLY EXPLOSIVE LEVEL. PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT CHARGE HAD SCHEDULED ROUTINE MEETING WITH UNDER SEC MFA GHUBASH TO ACCESS POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER RETALIATORY ACTION BY UAE AGAINST US. FORTUNATELY,

\*WHSR COMMENT \* \*


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WAS ABLE TO PRESENT GHUBASH WITH TEXT OF CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION AND STATEMENT MADE BY AMB SCALL FOR WHICH HE MUST APPRECIATIVE. PERSONALLY AMIABLE AS ALWAYS, GHIBASH. EXPRESSED WELCOME SIGH OF RELIEF THAT GREAT PURERS HAD FINALLY TAKEN RESOLUTE ACTION TO DEFUSE DANGEROUS SITU-TION AND TO WURK JUINTLY FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT ON BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242. POESPITE WHAT HE CONSIBERED LONG FELAY IN US-USSR JOINT ACTION, CHUBASH PLEASED THAT DETENTE AGREE-MENT EINALLY SEEMS: TO BE YIELDING DIVIDENDS. UNDER SEC **ASSUMED NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD NOTOYAVE** BEEN INTRODUCED HAD SUPERTOWERS NOT DETAINED AT LEAST. PRIDE BASIC CONSENT OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND WITHOUT UNDER-STANDING BETWEEN THEMSELVES OF ACCEPTABLE INTERPRETATION DPN: NTENTIONALLY CAMBIGUOUS SCR-242. GHUBASH, EMPHASIZED THAT WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF 242 AND, MURE IMPERTANTLY, RESOLVE OF SUPER POWERS TO PRESSURE THEIR RESPECTIVE CLIENTS INTO NEGOTIATING FIAR SETTLEMENT. SITUATION AFTER CEASE-FIRE WOULD REVERT TO INCONCLUSIVE MAGGEING OF PERIOD 1967-73, WHICH UNACCEPTABLE TO ARABS.

GHUBASH SAUMITTED THAT REACTION LOCALLY TO US SUPPORT OF ISRAEL HAD REACHED DANGEROUS LEVEL; CRISIS HAD SELF-GENERA-PANS EMPTIONALISM AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONCEIVABLE COULD FORCE SHAIKH ZAYID TO TAKE STRONGER RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST US. CONCEDING THAT BREAK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US HAS BEEN DICSP SED, GHUBASH SAID THIS COURSE HAD BEEN REJECTED FOR TIME BEING AS CONTRARY TO CONGER TERM INTERESTS OF UAE. GHUBASH NOTED THAT IN MEETING WITH JOURNALISTS TWO DAYS AGO ZAYID HAD SPOKEN ABOUT PUSSIBILITY OF BREAKING RELATIONS WITH US IN UNLY WAY HE CUULD, NAMELY, SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES NECESSITATE, UAE WOULD HAVE TO ACT IN ACCURDANCE WITH ARAB INTERESTS. GHUBASH WAS OF THISTIC THAT CEASE-FIRE AND BEGINNING OF SERIOUS NE-GOTTATIONS TOWARD STATEMENT WOULD DIFFUSE LOCAL TENSIONS AND REMOVE CAUSE FOR FURTHER ANTI-US ACTION. HE EMPHASIZED WHAT HAS BEEN APPARENT TO ALL SINCE ZAYIDIS RETURN) NAMELY THAT: UAE PRESIDENT TAKES HIS RESPONSIBILITY AS ARAB LEADER VERY SERIOUSLY, RANDAIS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO ASSISTING BOTH. EGYPT AND SYPIA.

CHARGE TOLD GHUBHTTLTHAT WHILE THIS HAD BEEN TRYING PERIOD FOR EMB STAFF, AND AMERICAN CITIZENS HERE, WE FULLY UNDERSTANDING OF TRAUMA THAT ARAB WORLD PASSING THROUGH, AND THEREFORE, WE HAVE TRIED TO FULLOW POLIVY OF "PLAYING IT COOL" AND ASSUMING LOWEST POSSIBLE POSTURE. FUR OUR PART, WE UP NOT INTEND OD ANYTHING THAT WILL DISRUPT GOOD RELATIONS DEVELOPED WITH UAE OVER PAST TWO YEARS. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S INQUIRIES, TOLD GHUBASH WE HAVE REPORTED SITUATION HERE CALM AND EMB FORESEES UNDER

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PRESENT CIPCUMSTANCES NO NEED FOR EVACUATION OR LIVE ACTION.

GHUBASH SAID BUSINESSLIKE AND UNEMOTIONAL WAY USG SLEAS TO BE REACTING HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON DAEG, AND IM LUNG TERM THIS APPROACH SEEMS TO BE WISEST POLICY REGARDLESS OF DEVELOPENTS, WHICH NOW LOOKED MUCH MORE PROMISING. GHUBASH STRESSED, AS HE HAS DONE FREQUENTLY IN PAST, THAT DEFICIAL STRAIDS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWEBTO INTERFERE WITH DUR PERSONAL PROLETATIONSHIPS. ONCE AGAIN HE REASSURED EMB OF FULLEST OF DERATION IN MAINTAINING SECURITY OF OUR FACILITIES AND UAEG IS PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN ANY REASONABLE REQUESTS A MIGHT HAVE FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES.

GREATLY RELIEVED AS RESULT JOINT OS-USSR INITIATIVE. AUGUST SHOULD BE GREATLY RELIEVED AS RESULT JOINT OS-USSR INITIATIVE. AUGUST HIMSELF SURPRISED BY INTENSITY OF ZAYID'S DEDICATION I ARAB CAUSE, BUT HE ALST CURRECTLY OBSERVED THAT ZAYID AND COVE DUE TO THEIR BEDU DRIGINS, INHERENT WEAKNESS OF STRUCTURE, AND LACK OF SOPHISTICATION, ARE VIRTUALLY AT MERCY INFLUENTIAL MORTHERN ARABS. IN PARTICULAR, HE DAS OBSERVED THIS IN DEGREE TO WHICH ZAYID INFLUENCED BY QUESTIONING TECHNIQUE OF ARTICULATE ARAZ

WED PRACTICALLY PUT WORDS IN HIS MOUTH. DAUNES ALSO THOUGHT USG HAD BEEN VERY SMART IN NOT PRESENTING FORMAL PROTEST TO ABU DHABI OVER STOPPAGE OF BIL. APPARENTLY ZAYID HAD EXPECTED PROTEST. ALTHOUGH NORTHERN ARABS MAY HAVE INTERPRETED THIS AS WEAKNESS ON PART OF USG, BEDU TEND IN REGARD SILENCE AS SIGNALLING UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFICULT SITUATION.

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